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Abstract  
This paper investigates the phenomenon of Initial Public Offerings 
underpricing on China A-share market both in Shanghai stock market 
and Shenzhen Stock ranging from the year 2003 to 2007. Firstly the 
research indicates that the underpricing of IPO exists in every stock 
market. Secondly, literature reviews made by western researchers 
and Chinese researchers would be firstly introduced. Specifically, 
some important theories would be reviewed, such as signaling 
K\SRWKHVLV ZLQQHU¶V FXUVH K\SRWKHVLV DQG LQYHVWPHQW EDQN
hypothesis etc. In this part, special features in Chinese stock market 
would be focused on. Thirdly, it should be interpreted that the data 
collection and the methodology used in this paper. The research 
would use multiple liner regression model to analysis underpricing 
level and investigate some factors that might affect underpricing of 
IPO. The variable used in the regression should be detail explained 
and the hypothesis should also be proposed in this part. Next, 
according to the regression results, it indicates that underpricing in 
China is serious, and the special Chinese regulations and systems also 
affect the magnitude of IPO underpricing. Finally, it can be concluded 
that the influencing elements can affects the level of IPO underpricing 
phenomenon to some extent. However, the Chinese stock market not 
mature compared with the developed stock markets.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 IPO Underpricing in Chinese stock market 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is primarily in terms of investments in 
securities of companies who seek listing for the first time. In order to 
JHQHUDOO\ UDLVLQJ IXQGV IRU WKH FRPSDQ\¶V EXVLQHVV JURZWK DQG
expansion, companies have preference to go public on a stock 
exchange. Therefore, the company who is willing to go public will offer 
part of its securities to be subscribed by the public, as part of the 
listing exercise (Sekuriti, 1999).  
However, many previous studies demonstrate that Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) has been one of the main drawbacks in global 
financial markets, particular leading to the market inefficiency 
because of IPO underpricing. It is a phenomenon when the trading 
price for new shares on the first day is higher than the issuing price, 
hence, giving rise to an abnormal initial return equals to the difference 
between trading price and issuing price on the first trading day.  
According to Yuan (2009), when private funding and bank loan are 
limited, an individual company may ask for funds from the public 
capital market through IPO to sustain its organic expansion or finance 
its new projects. Each issuing company for IPO wish its new public 
shares to be priced as high as possible in capital market so that the 
maximum substantial capital funds can be raised, by contrast, most 
IPO new shares in fact will be priced relatively lower than their 
subsequent trading price in the secondary market. IPO underpricing is 
a puzzling phenomenon which gives rise to conjectures of market 
imperfection, market inefficiency or even market failure and it 
probably hurts rising companies who are trying to raise capital for 
business expansion or growth (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; 
Loughran et al, 1994; Chambers, 2005). 
It can be deducted from most empirical studies that the phenomenon 
of IPO underpricing is more common and severe in developing 
countries than developed countries.  
Table 1 
 
Source: /LKXL 7 DQG 0HJJLQVRQ : /  µ(;75(0(
UNDERPRICING: DETERMINANTS OF CHINESE IPO INITIAL 
5(78516¶ 
As table 1 indicates, the average initial return for Chinese IPOs from 
1991 to 2000 nearly touched 300% on the first day of listing, the 
underpricing returns for Chinese IPOs are perhaps the highest in the 
world, even up to recent years. Although the setting prices for 
companies who are seeking listing will be settled a little bit lower 
when new shares are going public, those shares will be priced quite 
high when they are really going public for trading on the first days on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock exchange. Hence, 
investors would regard this phenomenon as a reward of excess return 
if they invest on these new shares. It is really an unhealthy 
investment idea and harmful to the development of Chinese stock 
market. According to Qiqi (2009), the annual average underpricing 
return of Chinese IPOs for A-shares companies on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange was 145.87%, during 1991 
to 2004. This indicator decreased to 83% in 2006 after a large 
state-owned share reforms have been promulgated since 2005. And 
the latest available statistics illustrate that the annual average 
underpricing return for Chinese IPOs grew to 140% in 2007.  
High level of IPO underpricing phenomenon implies the low efficiency 
of Chinese stock markets on increasing financial risks and reduction of 
resource allocation efficiency. On one hand, high IPO underpricing 
makes large amount of capital resorted for long period in primary 
market to subscribe for new shares, as well as a shortage of capital in 
secondary market leading capital allocation inefficiency (Tong and Liu, 
2010). On another hand, quite obvious gap between the trading price 
on first trading day and issuing price for new shares would draws 
illusion that these shares are really worthy to the price, and then 
investors might invest large amounts in these shares. It seems that 
the investment becomes more likely as gambling if some companies 
with financial frauds or pretty poor performances taking part into 
initial public offerings. The resource allocation in Chinese stock 
market may be critically distorted. The long-term presence of this 
phenomenon would redXFH LQYHVWRUV¶ LQLWLDWLYHVRQVWRFN LQYHVWLQJ
which is really harmful to the long-term development of stock 
markets.  
Furthermore, Tong (2009) illustrates that high IPO underpricing on 
initial return of the new shares might lower down the cost of funding 
of IPO firms, which might probably negatively impacts the new 
market mechanism. The financing amount for the issuing companies 
ZRXOGEHGHFUHDVHGDVZHOO&RQVHTXHQWO\ µWKHFRPSDUDWLYHO\ ORZ
risks undertaken by underwriters appropriately damage the 
long-term development of Chinese investment banks, because it 
might encourage their rent-seeking behaviors and shady deals with 
UHODWHGSDUWLHV¶7RQJ  
1.1.2 Chinese IPO Market 
When it comes to Chinese IPO market, there are basically three types 
of shares can be issued after IPO, which are A-shares, B-shares and 
H-shares traded in official Chinese stock exchange like Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Among these shares, 
A-shares are available to ordinary domestic individual holders; 
B-shares are mainly available to certain authorized domestic 
securities firms and foreign investors in Mainland, while H-shares are 
available for investors trading shares on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (Chien-Hsun and Hui-Tzu, 2003). 
As China is a socialist country, there are some diversified 
characteristics like IPO processing, IPO pricing and new shares 
allocation when we discuss IPO listing process and issuance, which 
are different from other countries.  
First of all, most new shares issuances each year are parts of national 
investments and credit plans. The central government controls the 
IPO process and total IPO size. Ti (2005) and Ka Lok, et al. (2001) 
indicate preciously that the aggregate amount of new shares which is 
called quota is determined by the State Planning Commission (SPC), 
central bank in China or China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). After determining the aggregate amount for IPO, the quota 
will be allocated to provisions or commissions with production 
structure, industrial base and recognition of balanced regional 
development to attain distribution objectives. The provisions or 
commissions have authorities to request or select companies to go 
public based on their good performance, as well as the 
accomplishment of sectional development objectives. While, the 
selection process for IPO was changed after 2000. Central 
government allows investment banks to have authorities to select or 
recommend companies to the CSRC for issuing and listing. After 
selected companies achieve the formal examination proposed by 
CSRC, their IPO applications will be sent to IPO Auditing Committee 
for final decision to approve the IPO or not. This is distinguished from 
those countries that stock exchange has authorities to directly select 
and decide approval of IPOs.  
Secondly, the new shares issuance of IPO has different pricing 
mechanism from other countries. The pricing mechanism for new 
shares issuance in China has been going through about five pricing 
mechanisms involving fixed prices, fixed P/E ratio pricing, 
book-building pricing mechanism, forecasted P/E ratio pricing 
mechanism and biding pricing with preliminary inquiry. Ka Lok et al. 
(2001) summarized that IPO pricing was generally adopted by 
forecasted P/E ratio which was proposed by CSRC before 1998. The 
IPO price based on P/E ratio can be explained by follow formula: 
IPO price = (Forecasted Earnings/Weighted Average Number of 
Shares Outstanding in the IPO year) * P/E. 
+RZHYHU DFFRUGLQJ WR ,32 XQGHUSULFLQJ VWDWLVWLFV PRVW ,32V¶ 3(
ratio was between 12 and 15 at that time so that IPO price has narrow 
range to be used for different sizes of companies. Since 2001, CSRC 
adopted a book-building mechanism in Chinese stock market for IPO 
pricing, which includes the company and the underwriter deciding 
together the preliminary offer prices range. The underwriter will then 
measure the demand of institutional investors for these particular 
shares, and revise the offering price in terms of demand (Ti, 2005).  
Up to the recent modification since 2004, CSRC promulgated new 
pricing standard for new shares issuance of initial pricing offering. The 
new modified standard clearly stated that companies issuing new 
shares for going public and its recommended commissions should 
settle the stock price by negotiating and asking advises from investors. 
Those companies issuing new shares are able to directly settle stock 
price after asking advises from investors, but not necessarily doing 
book-building pricing. To be mentioned, since this new standard has 
been promulgated in 2005, the numbers of IPO underpricing for initial 
return on first day has been dramatically decreased. Chengzhong 
(2008) showed statistic that during the first-six month in 2005, the 
rate of IPO underpricing for initial return on the first day of 15 IPO 
companies was 52.84%, which was the lowest rate of undepricing 
since Chinese stock exchanges are set up. The new pricing 
mechanism is beneficial to reducing information asymmetry between 
issuing IPO companies, underwriters and investors. The pricing 
method is in publicity between regulators, investors and issuing 
companies that enhances resources allocation efficiency in IPO 
market. 
Finally, the shares allocation mechanism in Chinese IPO market is 
contributing to the speculation on IPOs. Before 2000, the most 
popular share allocation mechanism was based on mainly a lottery 
system in which there were a fixed number of application forms for 
each individual investor to purchase. If the investor won the lottery, 
they were able to be entitled to a certain number of shares per 
winning form. Other new shares allocation methods were 
subscriptions related with bank deposits; online blind auctions and so 
on (Liu and Li, 2000). However, with the development of Chinese 
stock exchanges, there are quite an increasing numbers of long-term 
investors appearing every year. CSRC then modified another share 
allocation method for stronger demand when buying new shares of 
IPO companies. According to Ti (2005), investors who already owned 
tradable shares could subscribe to a quantity of new shares, this 
quantity dependent on the market value of their shareholdings. This is 
a respectively fair allocation method compared to lottery system. 
With a certain limitation on the purchase this quantity, each long-term 
investor has authority to purchase a certain amount of new shares in 
terms of their shareholdings.             
1.2 Research Purpose and Contribution  
The purpose of choosing Chinese stock market as the observation 
target is because Chinese stock market is much more special 
compared with other western mature stock market. Firstly, the 
abnormal initial return in China is quite high, during the year 2003 to 
2007 the average initial abnormal return is 113.56%, with the 
maximum point at 538.12%. Secondly, the Chinese is relatively 
younger compared with any other western mature stock markets. It is 
fairly new and immature one. Moreover, the Chinese stock market 
condition is to some extent special, which is an emerging market that 
transfers from centered-planned economy to a market oriented one. 
Therefore government regulations and systems are assumed to be 
important factors that affect the magnitude of the IPO underpricing.   
The contribution of the research consists of three parts. First of all, 
government interfere in operations of Chinese stock market, it is 
widely acknowledged that the equity separation reform  exercised by 
Chinese government allows most of state-owned shares and 
corporate shares are permitted to trade in the secondary market. In 
the research, it is assumed that the equity separation reform as a 
dummy variable, if the IPO of shares take place before equity 
separation it takes value of 0, otherwise it take 1. The regression 
results indicate that the equity separation reform has a positively 
relationship with the IPO underpricing and has not significant 
influence on the magnitude of IPO underpricing. 
0RUHRYHUWKHUHVHDUFKDOVRFRQGXFWHGWKHXQGHUZULWHUV¶ reputation 
ZKLFK ILQGV WKDW WKH UHVXOWV DJDLQVW WKH XQGHUZULWHU¶V UHSXWDWLRQ
theory. The reason that the result against the original hypothesis is 
underwriters are money oriented, in order to earn more money by 
underwritten more companies they might not strictly due diligence 
and test the quality of the company. Moreover, in China most 
investors are blindly trust the high reputation underwriters with the 
government background, which connives the high reputation of the 
underwriters set the offer price according to their interests. 
Furthermore, the Chinese stock market is fairly new and immature. 
Lastly, the research brings industry insights to underpricing of IPO. 
The financial industry has a positive relationship with the magnitude 
of the underpricing, while the rest of five industries are negatively 
correlated with the level of the IPO underpricing. Due to the financial 
industry is quite different from the other industries. Majority of the 
financial industries are controlled by the government, and the 
government has more interference for the financial industry. 
Therefore, there would be less financial risk and less probability to 
bankruptcy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review  
2.1 Literature Carried by Western Researchers 
IPO underpricing indicates when issuing new shares, the trading price 
is higher than the issuing price. In general, IPO underpricing 
phenomenon exits in most of the stock markets around the world. The 
issue of IPO underpricing phenomena was first attempted to reveal by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the report on 
the Special Study of Securities Markets in 1963. Ibbotson (1975) 
found that there is a high abnormal return on the first trading day of 
IPO in American stock market; in the meantime he also found that the 
average initial return of IPO is approximately 1.4%. Over the past 
three decades, the high average initial return on new-issue shares all 
over the world promoted many researchers constant investigate the 
reasons of IPO underpricing. The scholars analyzed IPO underpricing 
from different angles based on different financial market, and 
obtained many theories about underpricing of IPO. Many researchers 
hold different views of the IPO underpricing phenomena. For instance, 
Spindt and Benveniste (1989) believe that the IPO underpricing 
KDSSHQVLQLPSHUIHFWPDUNHWRZHWRLQYHVWPHQWEDQN¶VGLVFULPLQDWLYH
allocation of new shares. Loughran (1994) stress that the 
underpricing corresponds to a form of market inefficiency and it is also 
harmful to new firms trying to raise capital through the issuing. 
Chambers (2005) hold an extreme view which he indicates that the 
IPO underpricing is to some extent of market failure.   
Ljungqvist(2007) generally divides all western market oriented 
theories into four groups, which are information asymmetry theories, 
institutional theories, ownership evidence and control theories, and 
behavioral finance theories. Different theories focus on various 
aspects of the relations between investors, underwriters and issuers 
by different angles in the process of IPO. According to the newest 
empirical evidence, the information asymmetry theories have the 
strongest explanatory power among the four, while the ownership and 
control theories stand the least.  On the contrary, institutional 
theories and ownership-control theories of the emerging stock market 
in China have much stronger explanatory power than those of western 
stock markets. Meanwhile, the asymmetric information and 
behavioral finance theories also contribute to a certain extent. Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989), Beatty and Ritter(1986), Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989), Rock (1986), Welch (1989) and more recently,Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), have all attempted to explain underpricing as an 
equilibrium phenomenon. 
2.1.1 Information asymmetric theory  
The information asymmetric theory has been assumed the earliest 
and the best established block of IPO underpricing theories. In 
general, there involves three major parities which are the issuers, the 
underwriters and the investors in the process of the IPO transaction. 
The well-established and most thoroughly researched theory of 
asymmetric information based models assume that one of these key 
parities in IPOs have superior information than others. The underlying 
assumption of the information asymmetry theories is that one party in 
the IPO procedure, for example the underwriter, the issuer or even 
some investors, asymmetrically possesses some information which is 
hidden from the other party/parties. 
Broadly speaking, there are three hypotheses under the asymmetric 
LQIRUPDWLRQ ZKLFK DUH ZLQQHU¶V FXUVH K\SRWKHVLV LQYHVWPHQW
hypotheses and signaling hypotheses.  
2.1.1.1 :LQQHU¶V&XUVe theory 
Rock (1986) and Ritter (1984) states that there is information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. For the 
informed investors, they have compared advantage in knowledge of 
information and they can identify the true value of the issuing 
company. While for the uninformed investors, they know little 
LQIRUPDWLRQRIWKHYDOXHRIWKH,32VKDUHVDQGILUP¶VYDOXH+HQFHWKH
uninformed investors take disadvantage position in the competitions. 
In the meantime, there are also two types of the IPO shares which 
known as high quality share that is worth to invest and trash shares 
that are not worth to invest. It is widely known that informed 
investors always crowed out the uninformed investors for allocations 
of profitable in financial market. Better informed investors always 
purchase the high quality shares and reject the trash shares because 
of they are familiar with financial situations of issuing firms. 
Furthermore, as the uniformed investors cannot identify the quality of 
the issuing shares, they would like to purchase the shares at random. 
As a consequence, the majority of the trash shares would be 
purchased by the uninformed investors to a large extent. Well 
informed investors are preferred to by high quality shares, thus 
uninformed investors are likely to be kick out of the market. 
5HIHUULQJWRZLQQHU¶VFXUVHK\SRWKHVHVXQLIRUPHGLQYHVWRUVZLOOTXLW
the primary market when there is no compensation. Nevertheless, 
primary market needs uniformed investors as well, because informed 
investors cannot buy all the IPO shares in the market. Therefore, in 
order to issue new shares successfully, the issuing companies need 
both informed and uninformed investors to participate in trading. 
+HQFHLQRUGHUWRDWWUDFWXQLQIRUPHGLQYHVWRUVWKHILUPV¶,32VKares 
price should at a low level. Consequently, underpricing of the IPO is a 
compensation for the uninformed investors of lacking of information. 
Beatty& Ritter point out that the more uncertainty of the value of the 
issuing companies the more costs for investors to collecting 
information. This expands the information gap between informed 
investors and uninformed investors, which result in increasing 
underpricing degree. Koh& Walter (1989) and Levis (1993) proved the 
ZLQQHU¶V FXUVH K\SRWKHVHV E\ XVLQJ WKH Gata of Singapore stock 
market and UK stock market respectively. Both of their results 
significantly indicated that asymmetric information in investors 
leading to high level of IPO underpricing. 
2.1.1.2 Investment Bank Theory 
In general, investment bank hypotheses indicated the information 
asymmetric between issuers and underwriters. Baron (1992) points 
out that an information asymmetry between the underwriters and 
issuers causes a large first day return of IPOs. Baron (1982) also 
claims that the underwriters are better informed than the issuers for 
the appropriate prices of IPO shares as they are more familiar to know 
the actual demand of shares in market and potential demand of 
investors. As a result, the issuers must compensate the underwriter 
for the use of his information and the underwriter has an incentive to 
minimize his efforts in selling the issue by offering the shares at 
GLVFRXQW$VLWLVKDUGIRULVVXHUVWRPRQLWRUDQGFRQWUROXQGHUZULWHUV¶
performance, the underwriters would like to reduce the IPO shares 
issuing price in order to cut down the risks and the cost of the sales. In 
brief, the underpricing of IPO provide compensatory discount to 
underwriters. The degree of under-estimating of issuing price is 
positively correlated with the level of asymmetric information. 
Whereas, many scholars hold opposite viewpoints compared with 
investment bank hypotheses. For example, Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989) find that when investment banks going public they 
also underpriced their own shares, even though there is no 
information asymmetric. Loughran& Ritter (1995) claimed that the 
purpose of investment banks under-estimated their share is that they 
can give some clients the underpriced IPO shares in order to get more 
working collaboration relationship in the future.  
2.1.1.3 Signaling Theory   
Baron (1982) claims that signaling hypotheses referred as there is 
information asymmetric between issuing companies and investors. 
Ibbotson (1975) is regarded as the first researcher to come up with 
original intuition for the signaling literature. Rock (1986) states that, 
the signaling hypotheses indicates underpricing of IPO is a signal that 
made by issuers to market, in order to show their intrinsic value of the 
firm.  Moreover, Allen and Fualhaber(1989) indicate that the issue 
company have comparative advantage in pricing IPOs than investors. 
As there exists the asymmetric information between issuers and 
investors, it is difficult for investor to distinguish the quality of issuing 
firms. In contrast to poor quality firms, high quality firms would like to 
conduct underpricing strategy to attract more investors (Grinblatt & 
Hwang 1989). As time passes, the investors will be more and more 
familiar with the issuing firms and firms would increase share price to 
show the actual value gradually. In addition, for high quality firms the 
overpricing in Seasonal Equity Offerings (SEO) is the compensation 
for the loss of the firms in IPO underpricing. While the poor quality 
companies have to use the only chance to issue shares as high price 
as possible. As Welch (1989) pointed out that the performance of the 
good quality and bad quality in the IPO underpricing process is a 
signal for investors to distinguish the quality of companies. 
2.1.2 Ex ante Uncertainty Theory 
When companies issue new shares, one of the most importation 
FRQFHUQVIRUWKH LQYHVWRUV LVWKHFRPSDQLHV¶ IDLUYDOXH7KHVKDUHV
price offered by the investors may in turn affect the face value of the 
issuing firm. Beatty and Ritter (1986) claim that the level of ex ante 
uncertainty surrounding the intrinsic value of an issue as a critical 
factor in explaining the underpricing, and the greater the uncertainty 
the large the underpricing. In other words, the more uncertainty of 
WKHLQYHVWRUVNQRZQDERXWWKHILUP¶VIDLUYDOXHthe more likely they 
will pay less in terms of face value, which essentially leads to new 
shares to be underpriced. The underlying argument is that higher 
uncertainty will proportionally lead to more benefit to the informed 
investors, which will deterioratHWKHZLQQHU¶VFXUVHSUREOHP,QUHVXOW
greater under-pricing is needed to compensate the uninformed 
investors. Their theory suggests that smaller firms should have higher 
under-pricing due to the higher risk associated with the smaller firm 
size. Based on the relationship between ex ante uncertainty and 
under-pricing, many researchers have elicited some other models. 
For example, Booth and Smith (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), 
Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988), Carter and Manaster (1990), 
and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) suggest that the quality of 
advising agents (e.g. investment bankers, accountants and auditors) 
is negatively related to IPO under-pricing levels. It is argued that 
more prestigious underwriters or advising agents can reduce the 
information asymmetry and thereby cut the underpricing cost. 
2.1.3 Market Trading Theory  
7KHEDVLFFRQFHSWRIPDUNHWWUDGLQJWKHRU\DVVXPHVWKDWWKHLVVXHU¶V
SURILWLQSULPDU\PDUNHWLVUHOHYDQWWRXQGHUZULWHU¶VSURILWLQVHFRQG
market. Therefore, the underpricing of IPO may be resulting from 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ DERXW XQGHUZULWHU¶V DELOLW\ RI HDUQ SURILW LQ VHFRQG
PDUNHW%RHKPHUDQG )LVKH PRGHOOLQJ WKH ³PDUNHW WUDGLQJ
WKHRU\´ 7KH\ KROG WKDW DOWKRXJK XQGHUZULWHUV GLVFRXUDJH TXLFN
selling their initial allocation shares, issuers expect underwriters to 
encourage a limit amount stock flipping to incentive the liquidity of 
IPO in secondary market. In order to accomplish the goal, 
underwriters are likely to allocate shares to investors who lower 
valuations of firm and restrict supply to investors who higher 
valuations of firm. The liquidity problem will be solved because such 
two gURXS¶V LQYHVWRUV KDYH DQ LQFHQWLYH WR WUDGH ZKHQ WKH VWRFN
began to trade in secondary market. In addition᧨ underwriters need 
to underpriced shares to induce lower valuation investors buy firms  
share. Although underwriters desire a higher offer price can gain 
great revenue, they can gain more profit in the active secondary 
market form market making. Therefore, underwriters prefer to set a 
lower offering price rather than market clearing price for the IPO in 
order to get higher profits. Based on this model, underpricing does not 
compensate for information costs, but for encourage the active in 
secondary market. 
2.1.4 Investor Behaviour Theory  
5LWWHUVXSSRVHWKH³LQYHVWRUEHKDYLRXUK\SRWKHVLV´EDVHGRQ
the behaviour finance theory. He claims that market is useless and 
amount of noise trading exists in the market. The transaction prices of 
new issued stock will seriously deviate from its intrinsic value. At the 
first trading day, due to the excessive optimistic of future 
performance of new issued stock among investors, market may make 
a wrong estimation of new shares valuation. In other words, the 
offering price does not under the market price, but the wrong 
HVWLPDWLRQRIVKDUH¶VYDOXHPDNHVLQYHVWRUVZLOOLQJWREX\WKHQHZ
issued stock at very considerable price. There is the overreaction 
phenomenon in the market; the most optimistic investors of IPO 
become participators in stock initial offering market. Due to this 
reason, the excess return of new issued stock existence, which also 
reflects the underpricing phenomenon of IPO. However, the 
overestimate of stock price is a transient phenomenon. With the 
correction of the new issued stock expectation by investors᧨the stock 
price will mark to market. As the result, its price will reduce to the 
market realize price and the speculative bubbles will burst. 
2.1.5 Ownership-Structure Theory  
Booth and Chua (1996) claim most of models based on information 
DV\PPHWU\ ³KDYH not explicitly considered the impact of target 
RZQHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH RQ LQLWLDO XQGHUSULFLQJ´ 8QOLNH WKH SDSHU RI
Brennan and Franks which I have mentioned above, Booth and Chua 
DVVXPH WKH ³LVVXHU¶V GHPDQG IRU RZQHUVKLS GLVSHUVLRQ FUHDWHV DQ
incentive to uQGHUSULFHG´7KH\HVWDEOLVKDPRGHORQWKHDVVXPSWLRQ
of underpricing of IPO can encourage dispersed ownership structures 
which will increases liquidity in secondary market. Due to the aspect 
RILVVXHU¶VGHPDQGRIEURDGRZQHUVKLSGLVSHUVLRQLQYHVWRUVVKRXld 
pay addition fee to collect information about IPO. They explain the 
underpricing of IPO arises to compensated investors for the addition 
fees and examine the determine factors to the equilibrium level of 
underpricing. 
Beatty &Ritter (1986) believed that investment banks in order to 
maintain their reputations, they prefer to underestimate IPO shares. 
If investment banks set a high price of IPO share, it might be 
considered as fraud, which would make investment banks lose the 
market share. Therefore, compared to common investment banks, 
investment banks with good reputation would be more cautious and 
more accurate when estimating the issuing price of IPO shares. They 
would not set the share price too high or too low. Thus, the degree of 
IPO underpricing would be lower. Therefore, reputation of investment 
banks has negative correlation to the degree of underpricing. 
Lougue (1973),Neuberger & Hammond(1974) made researches on 
investigating the relationship between degree of IPO underpricing and 
reputation of investment banks. Both results showed that IPO shares 
that underwritten by good reputation investment banks had low 
degree of underpricing than those underwritten by common 
investment banks. Carter and Manaster (1990) also backed up this 
theory. They found that shares that were underwritten by bad 
reputation investment bank shave higher degree of the underpricing 
than the shares that underwritten by investment banks with good 
reputation. 
2.1.6 Time Interval Theory 
Time Interval hypothesis indicates the more time interval between 
issuing and trading IPO shares, the higher degree of underpricing of 
IPO. Because the more time interval, the more uncertainty of the 
secondary market, share price might fluctuate along with time. 
Therefore, the trading price might lower than the issuing price. Beatty 
&Ritter (1986) showed the uncertainty to future was a result of 
asymmetry of information. The more uncertainty to future, the higher 
return would be expected by investors. In addition, because trading 
activities are changing daily in stock market, there would be more risk 
in long waiting time. In order to avoid such risk, underwriters and 
issuers prefer to under evaluate IPO shares on purpose. Because the 
more time interval, the more biased of the share price. If there are 
uncertainty problems, there would be compensation to shares. As a 
result the degree of underpricing of IPO would be serious. 
2.1.7 Speculative Bubble theory 
Speculative bubble hypothesis indicates that secondary market is 
inefficient in estimating IPO share price. Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990) did 
a research according to the efficient market hypothesis. After the 
research they found that secondary market was an inefficient market. 
The high initial return from first trading day of IPO came from active 
participations of traders and over reactions made by investors.  
When trading IPO shares, investors are over-optimistic to the 
prospect of shares, so the market value of share price would be 
over-estimated. In other words, issuing price of IPO shares is higher 
than the intrinsic value. Shares are overpriced by traders because 
investors over estimate the share price and they would like to 
SXUFKDVH,32VKDUHVZLWKKLJKHUSULFHWKDQLVVXLQJSULFH,QYHVWRUV¶
over reactions to shares lead to the abnormal high initial return of IPO 
VKDUHV 7KHUHIRUH XQGHUSULFLQJ RI ,32 H[LWV DQG LQYHVWRUV¶
over-enthusiasm would cause bubble in stock market. In addition, 
,32VKDUHVFDQQRWVDWLVI\LQYHVWRUV¶GHPDQGVXVXDOO\0DQ\LQYHVWRUV
cannot purchase IPO shares with issuing price. Therefore, investors 
have desire of speculation. They would like to purchase new shares 
with a higher price than the issuing price. 
Aggarwal. & Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1992) also tracked long term 
performances of shares. They found there was no high return existing 
in long term. So they indicated the reason of underpricing of IPO was 
because of the price bubble in short term. Lowry et al. (2008) found 
that the existence of speculative bubble would affect the uncertainty 
of demand, which affected underpricing of IPO. 
However, the phenomenon of over estimating new share price is 
temporary, because investors would know the true value of shares as 
they are familiar with more information of shares. Therefore, market 
would reset shares price, and the price would return to the normal 
level. Therefore, after IPO, price of new share would increase for a 
short time, which leading to speculative bubbles, and then, as time 
goes, bubble would burst. As a result, the price would return to the 
normal level. 
2.2 Literature Carried by Chinese Researchers  
Generally, the researches of underpricing of IPO made by Chinese 
scholars are mainly base on two aspects (Lufang, 2011). One is to test 
whether western theories of IPO underpricing can explain the 
underpricing IPO phenomenon in China. Another aspect is scholars try 
to find some factors that affect underpricing in China while taking 
consideration of Chinese special regulations and systems.  
2.2.1 Information Asymmetry in China Market 
The information asymmetry phenomenon in China market is a 
seriously problem compared with western courtiers because the long 
period of planed economy has left a long train of problems and 
difficulties. Wang ˄2005˅ claims that the characteristic of china IPO 
market facilitated the information asymmetry in China market. In 
addition, Su & Fleisher (1999) did a research on IPO shares on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. It showed that the higher the magnitude of 
the IPO underpricing, the more possibility for companies to realize 
SEO in the future, future, and the shorter the time interval between 
IPO and SEO. This is in accordance with signaling hypothesis. Xia & 
Wang (2002) made a research by using IPO shares from 1992-1999on 
Chinese stock market. They found though there was relationship 
between underpricing of IPO and SEO, however, the result is not 
significant, so the signaling hypothesis cannot be proved in Chi 
2.2.2 Underwriters reputation Hypothesis  
Tian  & Zhan. (2000) made a research on relationship between IPO 
yield and market shares of investment banks. They found the 
negative correlation of underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing 
was not supported by Chinese stock market, and they found the factor 
affected underpricing of IPO in China was due to the government 
regulations. 
2.2.3 7HVW:LQQHU¶V&XUVH  
Wang (1997) made a research to IPO shares on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 1997. He took into account of stock lottery rate and 
subscribed costs. The result showed the abnormal initial return was 
higher than the riskless rate return. Therefore he indicated that the 
5RFN¶V DV\PPHWULF information cannot be used in Chinese 
stock market when analysis underpricing of IPO.  
+RZHYHU'X-HWDODQG7LQJLQGLFDWHGWKDWZLQQHU¶V
curse can explain the IPO underpricing in China, and it was a main 
factor that affected underpricing in Chinese stock market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 Data and methodology  
3.1 Data collecting  
The sample used in this paper consists of 374 A-share IPO companies 
listed on both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange from the year 2003 to 2007. The data can be divided into 
two categories because of the equity separation reform, which are 3 
years before the reform and 2 years after the reform. The Data are 
UHWULHYHG IURP *7$B,32 &KLQD OLVWHG )LUP¶V ,QLWLDO SXEOLF Rffering 
Research Database A-shares) which was provided by GTA Information 
Technology Company. In addition, several missing data in the 
GTA_IPO were provided by another private information company 
which is known as Hong Kong Top Data Corporation. According to Chi 
and Padgett (2005), there is no big difference between the 
underpricing degree on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Hence the sample selected is taken as a whole 
without any further dividing thereinafter. In the database 
3.2 Methodology 
In this the paper, Stata would be used as a tool to regress the 
variables and analysis the data. The multivariate linear regression 
model is adopted to use as the basic method to examine the factors 
affected the magnitude the A-share underpricing in China. In the 
regression, the initial abnormal return is the dependent variable, and 
the other independent variables conducted in this regression are 
investigating the factors that influence the level of the underpricing of 
IPO. After investigate the previous studies and the characteristics of 
China IPO market, I choose the method which was introduced by 
Ritter (1991), McGuiness (1992) and Levis (1993) to measure the 
magnitude underpricing of IPO in the dissertation. 
The first day return of IPO of shares i is denoted as IRi ( initial 
abnormal return), which is the percentage change between the offer 
price of the share i on the first trading day and the closing trading 
price of the share i on the first trading day. Therefore, the formula of 
the initial abnormal return of stock i can be expressed by: 
IRi = (Pi0 ±Pi1)/Pi0 * 100% 
Where  
Pi0 ±is the closing price of the share i on the first trading day of IPO 
Pi1± is the issuing price of the share i on the first trading day of IPO 
3.3 Description of Variables and Hypothesis 
3.2.1Abnormal Initial Return of IPO 
Ritter (1984) found fluctuation in stock market would affect 
underpricing level. In bull market there is an upward trends of 
underpricing level, however, to the opposite, if there is a cold market, 
there would be a downward trends of underpricing of IPO. In addition, 
Chinese stock market is an emerging market that transfers from 
centered-planned economy to a market oriented one. Chinese 
government always takes an important role in primary market. As an 
emerginJ PDUNHW VRPH LQYHVWRUV¶ LUUDWLRQDO DFWLRQV ZKHQ PDNLQJ
investments also make Chinese IPO market is different to other 
mature stock markets. Therefore, underpricing of IPO exists and the 
level is different to other stock markets. 
3.2.2 Asset 
Asset can be represented the size of a company, large assets suggest 
the size of the company is big. Commonly, shares issued by large size 
firms always attractive investors more attention, and shares are 
highly focused by external investors. Hence, the relative information 
of the large size company should disclosure a lot and thereby reduces 
WKHOHYHORIDV\PPHWULFLQIRUPDWLRQ5HIHUULQJWRWKHZLQQHU¶VFXUVH
hypothesis, there is no need for issuers to attractive uninformed 
investors by underpricing the IPO, as the consHTXHQFHRIWKHILUP¶V
information is highly exposure. Therefore, the level of the 
underpricing would be lower. 
In addition, as the firms with large size would always catch the public 
DQGLQYHVWRUV¶DWWHQWLRQ8QGHUWKHZLGHO\SXEOLFFRQFHUQDQGVWULFWO\
supervision, the firm would perform better in operation which can 
decrease risk of the company. Therefore, the risk in large asset 
company should be lower. Ritter (1987) pointed out that risk of the 
company has a positive relationship with the magnitude of IPO 
underpriciQJ&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHFRPSDQLHV¶WRWDODVVHWKDVDQHJDWLYH
relationship with the level underpricing of IPO. It is should mention 
that, in order to make the data more precise it should be take 
logarithm value of asset.  
Hypothesis 1: Issuing fLUP¶VWRWDODVVHWKDVDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLS
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. 
3.2.3 Issuing scale 
In this paper, the issuing scale can be interpreted as the volume of 
issuing shares multiply by issuing price. Beatty & Ritter (1986) 
believed that the issuing scale can be used as an indicator to measure 
risks of a company. Specifically, companies with large issuing scales 
would receive more widely attention. Therefore, the risk and the 
probability of asymmetric information should be lower. There is no 
need for issuers to reduce issuing price to attract more investors as 
the low risk and asymmetric information.  In addition, Chi &Padgett 
(2005) believed that large issuing scale means supply of IPO shares is 
enough and it difficult be speculated, which results in a lower 
magnitude of underpricing. Thus, there is a negative relationship of 
the level underpricing of IPO and issuing scales. 
,QRUGHUWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHILUP¶VVFDOHDQGWKH
IPO underpricing, the variable LNSCALE should be conducted in the 
regression. It is should mention that, in order to make the data more 
precise it should be take logarithm value of scale. 
Hypothesis 2: ,VVXLQJILUP¶VLVVXHVFDOHKDVDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLS
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing.  
3.2.4Time interval  
There is a time interval between issuing time and trading time of IPO 
shares. The longer the time interval the higher the investors suffer 
from the risks, owning to the more uncertainty of the share prices. 
Beatty & Ritter (1986) claimed that the uncertainty to future was a 
result of asymmetric of information. The more uncertainty to future, 
the higher return would be expected by investors. 
Furthermore, the longer time interval increases the opportunity costs 
because of the capital used to buy new shares restored for a long 
period. Consequently, the expenditure for purchase IPO shares is 
higher. In order to be compensated, high initial return of IPO is 
expected by investors. 
On the other side, in the Chinese stock market, short time interval 
between IPO issuing time and trading time suggests the issuing 
companies have been performing well in both operation and 
management. Long time interval usually represents companies did 
not perform well in past, or they might obeyed the rules when 
applying for IPO, which will bring risks to investors. Therefore, issuing 
price of IPO shares would be set at a low level to attract more 
LQYHVWRUV¶DWWHQWLRQZKLFKDOVRFDXVHVDKLJKOHYHORIXQGHUSULFLQJ 
Hypothesis 3: The time interval between issuing time and trading 
time is positively correlated with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. 
 3.2.5 Age of company  
Moreover, the age of company should be considered as an important 
factor of the enterprise characteristic in the regression model. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) used the age of issuing company as 
the control variable to test the magnitude of IPO. They claim that the 
estimation of real value of a company should base on the performance 
RI FRPSDQ\ 7KHUHIRUH \RXQJ ILUPV GRQ¶W KDYH D ORQJ SHULRG IRU
development and then cannot provide enough financial reporting for 
analyst to estimate the future of company. Moreover᧨the performance 
of young company is not stable, amount of uncertain factors may 
DIIHFW WKH ILUP¶V DELOLW\ RI SURILWDEOH 7KHUHIRUH᧨ the asymmetric 
information problems are serious in young companies and expect to 
affect the initial return of IPO. Suppose the younger the firm᧨the 
higher the magnitude of underpricing 
Hypothesis 4: The age of the issuing firm is negatively correlated 
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. 
3.2.6 Circulation Rate 
Circulation rate can be represented that the percentage of volumes of 
shares in circulation to the total quantity of issuing shares. IPO shares 
are not fully going into circulation cycle is a unique feature in Chinese 
stock market, which can be seen as a result of government 
interference as well. Circulation rate can reflects the level of 
asymmetry information of investors; high circulation rate suggests 
there are more uninformed investors. As a result, the level of 
asymmetric information is higher and level of underpricing is higher. 
While, less circulation rate means the most shares are controlled by 
internal people of the issuing company. The higher proportion of 
shares that are controlled by management team, the more advantage 
PDQDJHUV ZRXOG FRPELQH VKDUHV ZLWK FRPSDQLHV¶ EHQHILWV 7KH
management team has more rich experience and ways to evaluate the 
shares; meanwhile they are also more familiar with information of the 
issuing share firm, such as operation performance, financial condition, 
and the profitability of the firm in the future. Therefore the risks of the 
companies would be lower and the level of underpricing would be 
lower. 
,QRUGHUWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHILUP¶VFLUFXODWLRQUDWH
and the magnitude IPO underpricing, the variable CIRR should be 
conducted in the regression. In this paper, circulation rate is assumed 
has a positive relationship with the level of IPO underpricing. 
Hypothesis 5: The circulation rate of the issuing firm has a positive 
relationship with the level of IPO underpricing. 
3.2.7 Lottery rate 
Lottery rate reflects the investorV¶GHPDQGLQSULPDU\PDUNHWDQGLW
also affect the optimism of investors to pay attention to the new 
issued shares in the primary market and influence the magnitude of 
abnormal return in the first trading day finally. The lower the lottery 
rate is, the more unbalance in demand and supply. As the demand is 
much higher than supply, investors would like to pay higher price to 
purchase shares. Therefore, the share price would be more biased 
which leading to high level of underpricing. In China, the lottery rate 
is extremely low in the stock market. 
$FFRUGLQJWRZLQQHU¶VFXUVHK\SRWKHVLVWKHLQIRUPHGLQYHVWRUVZRXOG
push aside the uniformed investors in the stock market. Under this 
hypothesis, the informed investors would like to purchase the shares 
issued by high quality firms. While, there is also a possibility for the 
uniformed investors to invest in good quality firms, which results in 
purchasing amount of IPO shares increase while the lottery rate 
decrease. Moreover, according to the signaling hypothesis, firms with 
high quality would have high magnitude of IPO underpricing while 
firms with poor quality would have a lower level of underpricing. Thus, 
the relationship between the lottery rate and IPO underpricing is 
negatively correlated. 
Hypothesis 6: The lottery rate of issuing firm is negatively correlated 
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. 
3.2.8 Liability rate 
The liability rate can be defined as the percentage of total debts to 
total assets of issuing firms. Jensen & William (1976) indicated that 
higher liability ratio induces the creditors have more power to monitor 
the issuing company. With more monitoring outside of the company, 
the level of the asymmetric information should be reduced. According 
to the asymmetric information theory, it is unnecessary for issuers to 
reduce issuing price to attract investors. 
In addition, higher liability rate represents there is higher financial 
risk of the company. Thus, the companies would try their best to 
ensure the shares can go public for the first time. According to the 
signaling hypothesis good quality companies would issue with lower 
share price to show the quality and the loss can be compensated in 
SEO. While, companies with higher liability rate have less probability 
to SEO. Hence, firms cannot bear the cost of issuing with the lower 
price, as a result, they prefer to issue with a high price. The level of 
underpricing would be lower.  
,QRUGHUWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHILUP¶VOLDELOLW\UDWHDQG
the magnitude IPO underpricing, the variable LIBR should be 
conducted in the regression. In this paper, liability rate is assumed has 
a negative relationship with the level of IPO underpricing. 
Hypothesis 7: The liability rate of the issuing firm has a negative 
relationship with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. 
3.2.9 Earning Per Share 
Earning per share (EPS) is a significant index that reflects financial 
situations of issuing firms. EPS is an important indicator for investors 
when they make investment, even though information asymmetric 
exists. When using EPS to measure the performance of firms, it is 
universally acknowledged that the higher the EPS the better the 
performance of the companies. According to the signaling hypothesis, 
good quality companies would like to decrease the issuing price to 
attract more investors, their loss would be compensated in SEO later. 
Therefore, companies with high EPS will have a high level of 
underpricing. Moreover, companies with high EPS would use 
underpricing strategy when issuing IPO shares, which leading to high 
level of underpricing. 
,QRUGHUWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHILUP¶V(36DQGWKH
magnitude IPO underpricing, the variable EPS should be conducted in 
the regression. In this paper, EPS is assumed has a positive 
relationship with the level of IPO underpricing. 
Hypothesis 8: ,VVXLQJ ILUP¶V HDUQLQJ SHU VKDUH KDV D SRVLWLYH
relationship with the magnitude of the IPO underpricing. 
3.2.10 Reputation of underwriters  
The rank of reputation of underwriters can reflect quality of 
underwriters directly. According to the underwrite reputation theory, 
upper ranking of underwriter have better reputation, and they would 
strictly control risks of the shares that they underwritten. Eillis, 
0LFKDHO\ DQG 2¶+DUD FODLPV WKDW WKH XQGHUZULWHUV ZLWK D
prominent reputatiRQSOD\SLYRWDOUROHLQPDUNHW¶VSHUIRUPDQFH 
In addition, for underwriters, in order to maintain their reputation and 
avoid making failure of IPO. They are more probably to decrease the 
issuing price to decrease the cost of issuing. Moreover, in order to 
keep good underwritten records, they prefer to underwriter shares in 
good quality companies. Good quality companies have less risk, and 
would perform better in the secondary market after IPO. Therefore, 
underwriters with good reputation can play their function as an 
agency, which can decrease the level of asymmetry information level 
EHWZHHQ LQYHVWRUV DQG LVVXHUV $FFRUGLQJ WR ZLQQHU¶V FXUVH
hypothesis, the lower level of asymmetric information, the lower 
underpricing level of IPO is. Thus there is negative relationship 
between reputation of underwriters and level of underpricing 
In order to investigate the relation between the reputation of 
underwriters and the magnitude IPO underpricing, the variable RPU 
should be conducted in the regression. According to the ranking, if the 
underwriter rank in the top 10 of Chinese underwriter, then the 
variable of REPU takes the value of 1, otherwise it takes value of 0. If 
level of underpricing of IPO exits due to the difference of the 
reputation of underwriters, then it suggests that reputation of 
underwriter takes an important role in affecting underpricing of IPO in 
Chinese stock market.  In this paper, reputation of underwriters is 
assumed has a negative relationship with the level of IPO 
underpricing. 
Hypothesis 9: The reputation of the underwriter has a negative 
relationship with the magnitude of the underpricing. 
3.2.11 Equity separation reform  
Equity separation is the unique feature in Chinese stock market. 
Equity separation means shares that issued by the same company are 
divided into circulation one and non-circulation. Because of the 
limitation of circulation shares, demand of IPO shares is far more than 
supply, which leading to unbalance development in stock market. It is 
lucky for investors who have the chance to buy IPO share. Therefore, 
investors would like to pay higher price to purchase shares, which 
makes shares price increasing. It would probably to cause speculation 
in stock market. 
Equity separation makes stock market system distorted. Under equity 
separation, there is no relationship between trading price of 
FLUFXODWLRQVKDUHVDQGVKDUHKROGHUV¶EHQHILWV7KHUHIRUHVKDUHKROGHUV
are indifference to volatility of share price, and they might not pay 
much attention on operating of companies, which increase the risk of 
the issuing company. According to Ritter (1987) there is positive 
relationship between risks and underpricing level. Thus underpricing 
level is high. In addition, equity separation makes primary market and 
secondary market separated. Therefore, there would be seriously 
bubble appear in the secondary market, which leading to high 
underpricing of IPO. (Liu&Xiong, 2005) 
In order to enhance stock market, reform of equity separation was 
carried on year 2005 in Chinese stock market. Equity separation 
reform made state owned shares that were not freely traded before 
can be circulated to public. After equity separation reform, more 
shares can be circulated in the market, which increase the supply of 
IPO shares. Speculation would be calm down, and accordingly, the 
underpricing level will decrease. 
In order to investigate the relation between the equity separation 
reform and the magnitude IPO underpricing, the variable REFORM 
should be conducted in the regression. In the research, if the IPO of 
shares take place before equity separation, it takes value of 0; 
otherwise, it takes value of 1. In this paper, equity separation reform 
is assumed has a negative relationship with the level of IPO 
underpricing. 
Hypothesis 10: The equity separation reform has a negative 
relationship with the level of underpricing. 
3.2.12 Offering P/E ratio 
The offering P/E ration can be represented as the percentage of share 
price to earning per share. The offering P/E ration is a crucial indicator 
to measure the value of the firm. New issued share with a high level of 
P/E ratio may generate the market price below the offer price at the 
first trading day. Nevertheless, in some situation there may exist the 
high P/E ratio with higher offer price and lower magnitude of 
underpricing for several large size companies. In addition, the 
VXSHULRU 3( UDWLR UHIOHFWV WKH PDUNHW FRQILGHQFH WR HQWHUSULVHV¶
performance and with an interrelated high offering price, which will 
lead to the lower degree of underpricing. After the Equity Dividend 
Reform, the negotiation between the issuers and underwriters is a 
determinate to the level of the P/E ratio. Hence, unlike fixed offering 
P/E ration by government in past periods, the initial return of IPO in 
³EUDQGQHZPDUNHW´LVH[SHFWHGWREHDIIHFWHGE\WKHYDOue of offering 
P/E ratio.  
Hypothesis 11: The firms issuing P/E ratio has a negative 
relationship with the level of IPO underpricing. 
3.2.13 Net fund raised  
Net fund raised can be defined as the total offering size subtracts the 
total offering cost of the issue company. Beatty and Ritter (1986) and 
McGuiness (1992) claims that there is a negative relationship 
EHWZHHQ WKH RIIHULQJ VL]H DQG WKH HIIHFWLYH RI WKH :LQQHU¶V &XUVH
Hypothesis. The explanation of this assumption can be concluded as a 
large offering size always belongs with relevant low magnitude of 
asymmetric information phenomenon. Furthermore, because of some 
enterprises raise large scale of fund with a huge expenditure of 
offering cost result in a small net fund raised by IPO. Therefore, a 
large offering size cannot represent the large amount of fund raised 
by issuers. Hence, realized offering size should be conducted in this 
model which not only consider about the offering size of the 
companies but also concern about the offering cost. The more value of 
the net fund raised by firms, the lower magnitude of underpricing 
expected of the IPO. 
Hypothesis 12: 7KH LVVXLQJ ILUP¶VQHW IXQGUDLVHGKDVDQHJDWLYH
relationship with magnitude of underpricing.  
3.2.14 Industry type 
The variable of industry is expected to affect the initial return of IPO. 
When investors make investment, they would like to take 
consideration of comities performance and the ranking in the same 
industry. According to the signaling hypothesis, companies with a 
better performance have more likely to continue operating and make 
SEO in the future, which might lead to a high level of underpricing. 
Moreover, according to speculation hypothesis, investors might be 
LQWHUHVWHGLQFHUWDLQLQGXVWU\,QYHVWRUV¶H[FHVVLYHO\HQWKXVLDVPWRD
certain industry would increase the share pricing which also result to 
a high level of underpricing.  
In order to test the relationship between the magnitude of 
underpricing and the industry types, the variable should be conducted 
in the regress. As there are six industry types which are financial 
industry, public industry, commercial industry, comprehensive 
industry and real estate industry, there should be five dummy 
variables. The dummy variable which was conducted as following   
Dummy Variable Matrix 
  
Financ
ial  
Publ
ic 
Real 
Estate 
Comprehen
sive  
Indus
try 
Commer
cial  
Financial 1 0 0 0 0 0 
public 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Real Estate 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Comprehen
sive  
0 0 0 1 0 0 
Industrial  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Commercia
l 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hypothesis 13: The magnitude of IPO underpricing is affected by 
different industry. 
3.3 Regression model  
In this paper, the multiple liner regression model is conducted to 
measure the determinants that influence the magnitude of the IPO 
A-share underpricing in China from the 2003 to 2007. The regression 
model is showed as following: 
,5  ǃ0  ǃ1$*(  ǃ2(36  ǃ3/1$66(7 ǃ4 /16&$/( ǃ5 
,17(59$/ǃ6 /,%57ǃ7 5(38ǃ8 1)5ǃ93(ǃ10IND1 + 
ǃ11IND2ǃ12IND3ǃ13IND4ǃ14IND5 ǃ155()250ǃ16LORT 
ǃ17 &,55İ  
:KHUHǃ0 LVWKHLQWHUFHSWWHUPǃ1 ±ǃ17 are regrHVVLRQFRHIILFLHQWİLV
the error term. 
Table 2 - Definition of variables in the regression model 
  
Variable  Definition  
AGE Age of company  
EPS Earning per share of past fiscal year  
LNASSET Assert of the issuing company 
LNSCALE  Firm's issuing scale 
INTERVAL The gap between offering day and listing day  
LIBRT Asset liability ratio of past fiscal year 
NFR Net fund raised  
PE Offering P/E ratio 
LORT Lottery rate 
CIRR Circulation rate 
IND Dummy variables 1 
IND1 100000=Financial  
IND2 010000=Public utility 
IND3 001000=Real estate 
IND4 000100=Comprehensive Industry  
IND5 000010=Industry 
REPU Dummy variables 2 
  1= Underwriters' reputation ranked at top 10 
  0=Underwriters' reputation does not ranked at top 10 
REFORM Dummy variable 3 
  1=the shares issued after equity separation reform  
  0=the shares issued before equity separation reform  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Results and analysis  
4.1 Test the model 
According to the relevant theory, the multivariate linear regression 
model need to be tested in the regression process, some problem 
such as multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity might exist that that 
would lead to the biased of the regression results. Multicollinearity 
occurs when the variables have strong relationship. Basically, if the 
absolutely correlation value between variables is higher than 0.75, 
their do exists multicollinearity (T abachnick&Fidell, 2007). According 
to the correlation matrix in the Appendix, all the absolutely values of 
the correlation are less than 0.75. Therefore, none of the variables are 
correlated with others from the results of the correlation matrix. 
Moreover, the VIF/Tolerance coefficient is an alternative method to 
test the multicollinearity of independent variables. According to the 
VIF outcome which is presented in the following table, indicates that 
none of the tolerance is below 0.1 or over 10. Hence, it can be 
conclude that there is no multicollinearity in the regression model. 
                       Table 3 ±VIT Test Result 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
LNASET 8.15 0.122699 
LNSACLE 7.91 0.126422 
IND5 6.79 0.147275 
IND2 5.94 0.168285 
CIRR 3.56 0.280973 
IND1 3.48 0.28763 
IND3 3.16 0.316723 
REFORM 2.82 0.354615 
NFR 2.74 0.364528 
LIBRT 2.3 0.435727 
IND4 2.24 0.446936 
PE 1.92 0.520781 
REPU 1.2 0.836774 
INTERVAL 1.17 0.856277 
LORT 1.12 0.890585 
AGE 1.12 0.893843 
EPS 1.04 0.965338 
Mean VIF 3.33   
 
Furthermore, in order to detect the heteroscedasticity of the model, 
White test should be conducted before the process of the regression. 
The null hypothesis of the White test is homoscedasticity, according to 
the outcome of the White test in the Appendix the P-value is 0.6364 
which is greater than 0.5 significant level. Therefore, there does not 
exist heteroscedasticity in the multivariate linear regression.  
Lastly, R-squared is an indicator which can reflect the fitting degree of 
the linear regression for the model. The interval of the R-square is 
between 0 and 1. The closer the R-squared value equal to 1, the 
better fitting the model. According to the Appendix the R-squared is 
34.86%, and the adjusted R-squared value is 31.75%. It means that 
34.86% of the IPO underpricing variable can be explained by these of 
13 independent variables. Moreover, F-value of the regression equals 
to 0 and assumed to be significant at 95% level, which reflects the 
regression model is meaningful to test. Thus, the model is appropriate 
to be used.  
4.2 Regression result analysis 
There are 374 IPOs in the A-share stock market from 2003 to 2007 
conducted in the regression. The table in the following indicates that 
there are six variables reflect the level of IPO underpricing in Chinese 
VWRFNPDUNHWDWVLJQLILFDQW OHYHO0RUHRYHU ILUP¶VDJHDVVHW
scale, P/E ratio, liability rate, underwriters reputation, net fund raised, 
industry and lottery rate negatively correlated with the IPO 
underpricing. While earning per share, time interval, circulation rate 
and equity separation reform have positive relationship to IPO 
underpricing in China. 
Table 4 ---Regression Result 
IR Coefficient  P value 
AGE -0.0137686 0.301 
LNASET -0.015247 0.870 
EPS 0.0086775 0.734 
LNSACLE -0.1805465 0.008** 
PE -0.017809 0.005** 
INTERVAL 0.0051443 0.203 
LIBRT -0.5657044 0.148 
CIRR 1.208434 0.033* 
REPU 0.031165 0.000*** 
NFR -1.25E-08 0.895 
IND1 0.0050546 0.989 
IND2 -0.1248563 0.680 
IND3 -0.1467644 0.651 
IND4 -0.2913786 0.386 
IND5 -0.1542768 0.574 
REFORM 1.147918 0.233 
LORT -0.3930125 0.016* 
_Cons 1.88191 0.159 
*P<0.05, 
**P<0.01,***P<0.001   
 
4.2.1 Initial abnormal return 
The table shows that the average initial return from 2003-2007 is 
113.56%, with the maximum value is 538.12% and minimum value of 
±9%, respectively. There is a huge gap between the minimum and 
maximum of the initial abnormal return. The negative value of the 
initial return on the first trading day indicates that the closing price is 
lower than the issuing price on the first trading day.  
Table5 ²Regression Variable Summary 
Variable N Minimum  Maximum Mean STD Deviation 
IR 374 -0.09 5.381216 1.135618 0.9619161 
LNASET 374 18.46918 29.58483 20.57325 1.827607 
LNSACLE 374 9.109967 15.71463 10.67714 1.199198 
CIRR 374 0.3718954 1 0.8709545 0.136545 
NFR 374 7751.59 6624329 188910.3 719529.5 
LIBRT 374 0.1009712 0.98037575 0.5701691 0.1597492 
PE 374 6.78 98.67 22.89386 9.066944 
INTERVAL 374 6 217 15.36096 11.03301 
LORT 374 0.0141825 1.94292 0.1935613 0.2677267 
AGE 374 3 20 5.318182 3.276832 
EPS 374 -0.08 31.24 0.5031818 1.64059 
According to the table in the following, it is obviously can be 
recognized that the magnitude of the IPO under pricing level is quite 
high. Specifically, the average initial return among the five years is 
113.56%, and the in the year of 2007 it climbed to the highest point 
during the 5 years which is 202.95%. The high magnitude of IPO 
underpricing indicates that the Chinese stock market is not completed 
and the information disclosure is not abundant. It also suggests that 
over speculation might exist in Chinese stock market. 
Table 6- Average Initial Return From 2003-2007 
Year Average Initial Return 
2003 73.98% 
2004 70.74% 
2005 45.12% 
2006 87.22% 
2007 202.95% 
Moreover, it can be learnt from the table that the year 2005 is the kick 
point of the IPO underpricing. In detail, from the year 2003 to 2005, 
the tendency of IPO underpricing level deceased smoothly. While, 
after the year 2005 the IPO underpricing level increased dramatically. 
As far as I am concerned, the possible reason for this phenomenon 
should be attributed to the effective supervision and improvement of 
regulations by the Chinese government. In the year 2005, Chinese 
government carried out the equality separation reform, which is an 
important reason to promote growth of IPO underpricing level in the 
following two years.  
4.2.2Asset 
It can be learnt from the table that the mean of the asset of the 
issuing enterprises is 20.57, and the maximum and minimum of the 
asset is 29.58 and 18.47 respectively. According to the regression 
outcome, there is a negative relationship between asset and attitude 
of IPO underpricing. It is consistency with the hypothesis in the 
&KDSWHU WKUHH+RZHYHU WKH ILUP¶VDVVHW LVDQRWVLJQLILFDQW IDFWRU
which affects the IPO underpricing at the 10% significant level. 
According to the asymmetric information theory, shares issued by 
large size firms always attractive more investors attention, hence the 
ILUP¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQGUHODWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQGLVFORVXUHDORW$VWKH 
consequence, the level of the asymmetric information should be 
reduced. Referring to the related policies in Chinese stock market, IPO 
shares should account at least 25% of the total shares. This indicates 
that the asset of the company determines the value of the IPO shares, 
which affect the level of underpricing. Furthermore, in the large size 
company, the free cash flow is more stable and the operating risks 
would be lower. 
However, the asst is not significant to reflect the IPO underpricing. In 
my opinion, the investors might be able to make rational evaluation to 
issuing firms when making investments and they would also prefer to 
follow the market trends of choose the IPO shares randomly. 
4.2.3 Issuing Scale 
The table shows that the mean of the issuing scale is 10.68 with the 
minimum and maximum value 9.11 and 15.71 respectively. 
According to the regression results, there is a negative relationship 
between the issuing scale and the underpricng of the IPO. It also can 
be learnt from the results that the fLUPV¶LVVXLQJVFDOHLVVLJQLILFDQWWR
influence the IPO underpricing at the 10% significant level, which 
means that issuing scale is one of the factors to influence underpricing 
in Chinese stock market. 
Beatty & Ritter (1986) believed that the issuing scale can be used as 
an indicator to measure risks of a company. Commonly, companies 
with large scale have the lower risk, and there is no need to reduce 
issuing pricing to attract more investors. 
Chi & Padgett (2005) believed that large issuing scale means supply 
of IPO shares is enough and it difficult be speculated, which results in 
a lower magnitude of underpricing. Compared to small issuing scale 
companies which is easily to be speculated by investors, companies 
with large issuing scale are easy to separate equity ownership. Hence, 
the IPO underpricing level can be affected by investors to change the 
issuing scale. 
4.2.4 Time Interval 
The chart suggests that the mean time interval is 12.88, with the 
minimum and maximum interval 6 days and 217 days respectively. 
The gap between maximum is quite big. Chen, Firth, and Kim (2003) 
suggest that the time interval between issuing time and trading time 
in China is longer than other maturity stock markets. According to the 
regression outcome, there is a positive relationship between the time 
interval and the magnitude of IPO underpricing. The result is 
consistent with the previous hypothesis which is the longer the time 
interval the higher of the underpricing level. However, the results also 
suggest that the time interval is not a significance factor that affects 
the magnitude of IPO underpricing at 10% significant level. 
The longer interval between issuing time and trading time, the more 
risk are in the share prices. As the feature of the stock market, time 
market changes rapidly in everyday, long time interval leads to more 
uncertainty in the future. Hence, to an investor, it is difficult for 
investors to ensure the value of shares in a long interval, which 
increase the purchasing risks. On the other hand, the longer time 
interval also results in increasing the opportunity cost, because of the 
capital used to purchase shares are occupied for a long time. 
Therefore, investors would like to expect higher compensation to the 
cost of capital, thereby increasing the level of underpricing. 
However, the time interval is not a significant level that affects the 
magnitude of IPO underpricing in China in the observation period. 
This result is quite different from any other previous study which was 
researched before the year 2005. As far as I am concerned, the 
difference result between my research and the other research before 
 LV WKH ³(TXLW\ 6HSDUDWLRQ 5HIRUP´ DQG ³PDUNHW SULFLQJ
PHFKDQLVP´WKDWZHUHLPSOHPHQWHGE\&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQW    
4.2.5 Circulation Rate  
The table indicates that the average circulation rate is 87%, with the 
minimum and maximum value 37% and 100% respectively. 
According to the regression outcome, there is a positive relationship 
between circulation rate and the magnitude of the IPO underpricing. 
The result is consistent with the original hypothesis. Furthermore, it 
also can be acknowledged from the table that the circulation rate is a 
significant factor to influence the magnitude of IPO underpricing at 10% 
significant level. 
Circulation rate can be represented that the proportion of shares that 
holding by internal of the firm. Comparison with other investors, the 
internal investors have more rich experience and ways to evaluate the 
shares, meanwhile they are also more familiar with information of the 
issuing share firm. Internal investors would operate company better 
and more effective in a higher circulation rate. While, internal 
investors in a lower circulation company is difficult to carry out their 
rights and make them in the weak position to generate the 
information of the issuing firm. As a consequence, these increase the 
information asymmetric. Because of the increase of information 
asymmetric, the issuing firms would like to decrease the issue price to 
attract more external investors, which results to a higher level of 
underpricing.  
In Chinese stock market, as a unique feature, IPO shares are not fully 
going in to circulation. Because of shares are divided into 
non-circulation shares and circulation shares. Furthermore, 
government always interferes a lot in capital market as a special 
condition in China. In the research, the circulation rate plays a 
significant role in influencing the IPO underpricing at the 10% 
significant level. 
4.2.6 Net Fund Raised 
The table indicates that the average net fund raised is 188910, with 
the minimum and maximum value 7751 and 6624329 respectively. 
There is a huge gap between the maximum value and the minimum 
value. According to the regression outcome, there is a negative 
relationship between net fund raised and the magnitude of the IPO 
underpricing. The result is consistent with the original hypothesis and 
DOVRLQGLFDWHVWKHZLQQHU¶VFXUVHK\SRWKHVLVLVDSSURSULDWHIRU&KLQHVH
during the observation period. Furthermore, it also can be 
acknowledged from the table that the net fund raised is an 
insignificant factor to influence the magnitude of IPO underpricing at 
10% significant level. 
It is known that, it is easy for institution investors to control small 
capitalization shares. Compared with large capitalization shares, 
small capitalization shares is in underpricing because of high degree 
of information asymmetric. Furthermore, informed investors always 
crowed out uninformed investor for small capital shares. On the other 
side, the underpricing magnitudes of large capitalization stocks are 
difficult to control because the fund raised is too large for each 
LQYHVWRU2QWKLVRFFDVLRQWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI³ZLQQHU¶VFXUVH´ZLOO
decrease obviously. 
In the research, the net fund raised plays an insignificant role in 
influencing the IPO underpricing at the 10% significant level. The 
insignificance indicates that the value of net fund raised is not an 
important factor for investors making investment. Therefore the value 
of net fund raised influences the level of IPO underpricing in Chinese 
market during the observation period.  
4.2.7 Liability Rate 
The table shows that the average liability rate is 57%, with the 
minimum and maximum value 10%and 98% respectively. There is a 
huge gap between the maximum value and the minimum value. 
According to the regression outcome, there is a negative relationship 
between liability rate and the magnitude of the IPO underpricng. The 
result is consistent with the original hypothesis. Furthermore, it also 
can be acknowledged from the table that the liability rate is an 
insignificant factor to influence the magnitude of IPO underpricing at 
10% significant level. 
A firm with high liability rate indicates that the company has more 
debt; thereby the firm has a higher financial risk. Therefore, fewer 
investors would like to invest the company with high liability ratio. 
Due to the investors who have already held the shares of such firms, 
they would like to expect a higher IPO underpricing as compensation. 
As a result, liability rate and magnitude of underpricing of IPO are 
negatively correlated. 
In the paper, the liability ratio is not the significant factor which 
influences the level of underpricing. As far as I am concerned, the 
reason for the insignificance is due to the Chinese stock market is not 
developed and the investors are irrational. As the irrational investors 
would like to purchase the shares according to their preference or 
IROORZWKHPDUNHWWUHQGVWKHRWKHULQYHVWRUV¶RSLQLRQDOVRFRXOGEH
affected their decisions.  
4.2.8 Earning Per Share  
The table shows that the average earning per share is 50%, with the 
minimum and maximum value -8%and 312% respectively. There is a 
huge gap between the maximum value and the minimum value. 
According to the regression result, there is a positive relationship 
between earning per share and the magnitude of the IPO underpricing. 
The result is consistent with the original hypothesis. Furthermore, it 
also can be acknowledged from the table that the earning per share is 
an insignificant factor to influence the magnitude of IPO underpricing 
at 10% significant level. 
(DUQLQJ SHU VKDUH LV DQ LPSRUWDQW LQGLFDWRU WR PHDVXUH WKH ILUPV¶
operation performance and profitability. Companies with high 
SURILWDELOLW\DOZD\VDWWUDFWLQYHVWRUV¶DWWHQWLRQ$VDUHVXOWWKHVKDUH
price will LQFUHDVHGXHWRLQFUHDVLQJO\LQYHVWRUV¶GHPDQG+HQFHWKH
initial abnormal return would be higher accordingly. 
In the research, earning per share is an insignificant factor which 
influences the level of underpricing. The reason for the insignificance 
is due to the Chinese stock market is not developed and the investors 
are irrational. Even though, earning per share is assumed as an 
important indictor to the offering price, it is useless for IPO in China 
stock market because most new issued shares are popular in the 
secondary market. Hence, earning per share does not affect the 
magnitude of IPO underpricing in China during the observed period.  
4.2.9 P/E Ratio   
The table shows that the average P/E ratio is 22.89%, with the 
minimum and maximum value 6.78% and 89.67% respectively. 
According to the regression result, there is a positive relationship 
between P/E ratio and the magnitude of the IPO underpricng. The 
result is consistent with the original hypothesis. Furthermore, it also 
can be acknowledged from the table that the P/E ratio is a significant 
factor to influence the magnitude of IPO underpricing at 10% 
significant level. 
The offering P/E ration is a crucial indicator to measure the value of 
the firm. New issued share with a high level of P/E ratio may generate 
the market price below the offer price at the first trading day. In 
addition, the superior P/E ratio reflects the market confidence to 
HQWHUSULVHV¶SHUIRUPDQFHDQGZLWKDQLQWHUUHODWHGKLJKRIIHULQJSULFH
which will lead to the lower degree of underpricing. 
In the research, earning per share is a significant factor which 
influences the level of underpricing. Fixed the offering P/E ratio is an 
important step of the whole process of IPO and always determine the 
VKDUH¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHVHFRQGDU\market. Therefore, the offering 
P/E ratio significantly affect to the magnitude of IPO underpricing. 
However, Liu (2005) and Yang (2007) claim that offering P/E ratio is 
positively correlated with the level of IPO underpricing. The reason of 
the divergence is that their observation period is before the year 2005, 
while the observation period of my research is 2003-2007, there 
years with new brand market in China. After the equity separation 
reform, the offering P/E ratio does not set by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Therefore, investors are preferred to 
purchase new issued shares with rational P/E ratio in the new brand 
market in China. Less demand of the new issued stocks with relatively 
high P/E ratio result in less magnitude of IPO underpricing.  
4.2.10 Equity Separation Reform 
The table suggests that the equity separation reform has a positive 
relationship to the underpricing of IPO. There is a divergence with 
original hypothesis, which equity separation reform is negatively 
correlated with the magnitude of the IPO underpricing.  
Furthermore, it also can be acknowledged from the table that the 
equity separation reform is not a significant factor to influence the 
magnitude of IPO underpricing at 10% significant level. The change of 
underpricing level before and after the reform might lead to 
periodically volatility in stock market but not the impact of reform. 
Moreover, after equity separation reform, though shares can be fully 
circulated freely but most of them cannot be traded in the stock 
market. This means that fully circulate is not equal to the circulation 
shares need to be forced trading on the stock market. This is because 
Chinese government wants to keep the absolutely controlling rights of 
shares. (Wang, 2011) Thus, full circulation would not bring pressure 
to stock market. This might be the reason of reform do not affect the 
underpricing level of IPO in China. 
For another aspect, compared to mature stock markets, shares that 
circulate in Chinese market are much less. In Chinese stock market, 
top shareholder hold 30%-40% of shares, sometimes the proportion 
would up to more than 50%. However, in mature market, only 
10%-20% shares are held by top shareholders (Zhang, 2009). Thus, 
there is a big gap between circulation shares in Chinese stock market 
and mature markets of other countries even though equity separation 
reform is carried. In addition, because Chinese market is immature, 
there are many irrational investors, and they are interested in 
investing in huge kinds and amount of shares. Therefore, the demand 
of shares is far more than supply. Accordingly, the separation reform 
would not affect Chinese stock market much.  
4.2.11 Industry Type 
The table indicates that the industry has mixture of relationship to the 
underpricing of IPO. It can be learnt from the table that there is a 
positive relationship between financial industry and the magnitude of 
IPO underpricing. While for the rest of the other industries there has a 
negative relationship. 
Furthermore, it also can be acknowledged from the table that only the 
financial industry is a significant factor to influence the magnitude of 
IPO underpricing at 10% significant level. Therefore, the financial 
industry is quite different from the other industries. As far as I am 
concerned, the possible reason for this phenomenon is the financial 
industry shares are more popular for investors than the other 
industries. Moreover, majority of the financial industries are 
controlled by the government, and the government has more 
interference for the financial industry. Therefore, there would be less 
financial risk and less probability to bankruptcy. Hence, the demand 
of financial industry IPO shares is far more than that of supply. 
Thereby, the prices increase resulting in the higher magnitude of 
underpricing of IPO. 
4.2.13 Reputation of Underwriter 
The table suggests that the reputation of underwriter is positively 
correlated with the underpricing of IPO. There is a divergence with 
original hypothesis, which reputation of underwriter is negatively 
correlated with the magnitude of the IPO underpricing. The result is 
against with the original hypothesis. Furthermore, it also can be 
acknowledged from the table that the reputation of underwriter is a 
significant factor to influence the magnitude of IPO underpricing at 10% 
significant level. 
As the regression results against the original hypothesis, this 
indicates that the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
the magnitude of IPO underpricing in the observed period is not 
conformity with the investment banking hypothesis and signaling 
hypothesis in China stock market. Logue (1973) and Cater et al (1998) 
DOVRFODLPWKDWWKHUHLVDSRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQXQGHUZULWHU¶V
reputation and the magnitude of underpricing based on their 
researches. As far as I am concerned, there are three reasons that 
made the results against the original hypothesis. Firstly, underwriters 
are money oriented, in order to earn more money by underwritten 
more companies they might not strictly due diligence and test the 
quality of the company. As a consequence, the underwriters do not 
devote themselves to set the shares correctly, which results the 
underpricing level. Secondly, it can be found that almost all the top 
ten underwriters in China have a background of government. As the 
regression results, in China, the high reputation of underwrites always 
create the relevant high level of IPO underpricing. The reason of this 
phenomenon is, in China most investors are blindly trust the high 
reputation underwriters with the government background, which 
connives the high reputation of the underwriters set the offer price 
according to their interests. Hence, the higher the underwriter 
reputation is, the higher of underpricing phenomenon exists in the 
secondary market. Last, the Chinese stock market is fairly new and 
immature. 
Furthermore, the reputation of the underwriters is significant with the 
OHYHORIXQGHUSULFLQJ7KLVFRQVLVWVZLWKWKH(LOOLV0LFKDHODQG2¶KDUD¶V
idea, which they claim that the underwriters with a prominent 
reputDWLRQSOD\DSLYRWDOUROHLQPDUNHW¶VSHUIRUPDQFH 
4.2.14 Age  
TKH WDEOH VKRZV WKDW WKHPHDQRI WKH ILUP¶V DJH LV ZLWK WKH
minimum and maximum value 3 and 20 respectively. According to the 
regression results, there is a negative relationship between tKHILUP¶V
age and the underpricing of the IPO. The result is consistent with the 
original hypothesis. It also can be learnt from the results that the 
ILUPV¶DJHLVQRWVLJQLILFDQWWRLQIOXHQFHWKH,32XQGHUSULFLQJDWWKH
significant level, which means WKDWILUP¶VDJHGRHVQRWLQIOXHQFHWKH
level of underpricing in Chinese stock market.  
When making investment decisions, investors would like to choose 
the older firms rather than younger firm. Because of firms with large 
age is less risky and they can provide more operation information 
than the younger firm. Therefore, the asymmetric information 
problems are more serious in younger firms and would influence the 
initial return of underpricing. Furthermore, according to the risk 
compensation theory, the offer price and offer size of a young firm is 
less than the older ones. As a result, the young firm is easy to be 
controlled by the institution investors. Consequently, new shares 
issued by a young enterprise would be speculated by investors and 
finally lead to high level of underpricing. 
4.2.15 Lottery rate  
The table shows that the mean of the lottery rate is 19.36 with the 
minimum and maximum value 1.42% and 194.29% respectively. 
According to the regression results, there is a negative relationship 
between the lottery rate and the underpricing of the IPO. The result is 
consistent with the original hypothesis. It also can be learnt from the 
results that the lottery rate is significant to influence the IPO 
underpricing at the 10% significant level, which means that lottery 
rate is one of the factors to influence underpricing in Chinese stock 
market. 
Lottery rate reflects market preference of IPO shares. The lower the 
lottery rate is, the more unbalance in demand and supply. To 
investors, the lower the lottery rate, the greater amount of capital 
would be used to buy IPO shares, as a result increase the cost of the 
SXUFKDVLQJ +HQFH WKH LQYHVWRU¶V H[SHFW UHWXUQ ZRXOG EH KLJKHU
Therefore, the share price would be more biased which leading to high 
level of underpricLQJ0RUHRYHUDFFRUGLQJWRZLQQHU¶VFXUVHWKHRU\
the stock market exist both informed investors and uninformed 
investors. The informed investors would push aside the uniformed 
investors in the stock market. Better informed investors would like to 
purchase shares issued high quality firm, meanwhile there is also a 
possibility for uninformed firms invest in good quality firm. As a result, 
the relationship between the lottery rate and IPO underpricing is 
negatively correlated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Conclusion 
The research focuses on the IPO underpricing phenomenon in Chinese 
stock market and tries to find the determinants that influence 
magnitude of IPO underpricing. The research analysis conducts the 
374 data selected A-share of IPO firms listed on both Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange between the years 2003 to 
2007. In the observation period, the average initial abnormal return is 
113.56%, with the minimum and maximum value of -9% and 
538.12%. The gap between the minimum and maximum value is 
quite huge. It can be conclude from the results, the initial abnormal 
return is seriously exist in Chinese stock market, the average of 
magnitude of underpricing is quite high. Moreover, under pricing level 
fluctuated in five years, the volatility of level of underpricing is very 
high. Due to the high level of the IPO underpricing in Chinese stock 
market, large number of scholars and specialists has focus on China 
market during a long period.  
According to the results, it can be conclude that several factors affect 
,32 XQGHUSULFLQJ LQ &KLQHVH PDUNHW 0RUH VSHFLILFDOO\ ILUP¶V DJH
asset, issuing scale, P/E ratio, net fund raised and lottery rate issued 
by financial industry is positive related with the IPO underpricing. 
While the EPS, inWHUYDOFLUFXODWLRQUDWHXQGHUZULWHUV¶UHSXWDWLRQDQG
equity separation reform have positive relationship with the level of 
underpricing. It is universally acknowledged that China stock market 
DIWHU  LV DVVXPHG WR EH ³EUDQG QHZ PDUNHW´ EHFDXVH RI DQ
important reform in financial market was implemented by the Chinese 
JRYHUQPHQWZKLFKLVQDPHG³(TXLW\6HSDUDWLRQ5HIRUP´+RZHYHU
according to my results, the so important reform does not 
significantly affect the magnitude of IPO underpricing. The reason 
might because after equity separation reform, there is still limitation 
for shares to be traded in the stock market. Because Chinese 
government wants to keep the absolutely controlling rights of shares 
after equity separation reform, most of shares would not be force to 
trade in the stock market though they can fully circulate freely. 
Therefore, full circulation would not bring pressure to Chinese stock 
market. Accordingly, equity separation reform does not affect the 
underpricing level of IPO in China. FurWKHUPRUH WKH XQGHUZULWHUV¶
reputation as another important variable is divergence with the 
original hypothesis. This is because of in China most investors are 
blindly trust the high reputation underwriters with the government 
background, which connives the high reputation of the underwriters 
set the offer price according to their interests. 
5.2 Findings  
According to the regression results, it can be learnt that all the 
elements as a whole explain 34.86% of the variance in IPO 
underpricing return in Chinese A-share market during the observed 
period. It is worth noticed that, issue scale, P/E ratio, reputation of 
underwriters, lottery rate and the circulation rate has significant 
influence on the magnitude of IPO underpricing. Amongst, the 
XQGHUZULWHUV¶ UHSXtation against the original hypothesis, while the 
other four elements are in consistent with the original hypothesis 
based the previous literature review. 
The findings of the research regarding the relationship between the 
influencing elements with the magnitude of the underpricing, and the 
significant level reflects the magnitude of the underpricing. The finds 
can be summarized below: 
)LQGLQJ 7KH LVVXH ILUP¶V DJH LV QHJDWLYHO\ FRUUHODWHG ZLWK WKH
magnitude of the IPO underpricing. And it is not a significant element 
that affects the level of initial abnormal return. 
)LQGLQJ 7KHLVVXHILUP¶VDVVHWKDVDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH
magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is not a significant factor that 
influences the level of IPO underpricing. 
Finding37KH LVVXH ILUP¶V(36KDVDSRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKH
magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is not a significant factor that 
affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
)LQGLQJ7KHLVVXHILUP¶VVFDOHKDVDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH
magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is a significant factor that 
affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
)LQGLQJ 7KH LVVXH ILUP¶V RIIHULQJ 3( UDWLR KDV D QHJDWLYH
relationship with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is a 
significant factor that affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
)LQGLQJ7KH LVVXH ILUP¶V WLPH LQWHUYDOKDVDSRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is not a significant 
factor that affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
)LQGLQJ7KH LVVXH ILUP¶V OLDELOLW\ UDWHKDV a negative relationship 
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is not a significant 
factor that affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
)LQGLQJ7KHLVVXHILUP¶VFLUFXODWLRQUDWHKDVDSRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLS
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is a significant factor 
that affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
Finding9: The reputation of the underwriters has a positive 
relationship with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is a 
significant factor that affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
)LQGLQJ7KHLVVXHILUP¶VQHWIXQGUDLVHGKDVDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLS
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is not a significant 
factor that affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
Finding11: The equity separation reform has a positive relationship 
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is not a significant 
factor that affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
)LQGLQJ7KH LVVXHILUP¶V ORWWHU\UDWHKDVDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLS
with the magnitude of IPO underpricing. And it is a significant factor 
that affects the level of IPO underpricing. 
Finding13: The financial industry has a positive relationship with the 
magnitude of the underpricing, while the rest of five industries are 
negatively correlated with the level of the IPO underpricing. All of the 
industries are not significant factor that influence the level of the 
underpricing. 
5.3 Limitations  
Firstly, the data sample size in this research is relatively small. There 
are only 374 shares selected from A-shares that issued on Shanghai 
stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange for 5 years. 
Secondly, when take consideration of Chinese special systems and 
regulations, the research only conducts equity separation reform as a 
variable to the regression model. If more special features of Chinese 
stock market are analyzed in the model, the result would be more 
convinced. 
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